GSP AND VCG BASED AUCTIONS FOR SPECTRUM SHARING IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS

SK.Surajjaha, K.Annapurna, B.Seetha Ramanjaneyulu

Abstract: Cognitive radio technology is a new mechanism proposed to address the spectrum related problems like under utilization by allotted users and scarcity to accommodate new users. Efficient sharing among competitive secondary users is one of the important tasks of cognitive radio systems. Auction based sharing is an efficient approach to allocate vacant channels to secondary users. In this paper, a cognitive radio network consisting of a central entity called primary owner (PO), many licensed users and many cognitive radio users (SUs) is considered. Each SU bids for a channel to have the spectrum from the PO which acts as auctioneer. Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey- Clarke Grooves (VCG) auctions are implemented for sharing. Performance is measured in terms of Social welfare, Revenue of PO and SU utilities.

Keywords: Cognitive radio, Spectrum Sharing, Generalized Second Price Auction, Vickrey - Clarke Grooves auction

DOI: https://doi.org/10.15623/ijret.2016.0506084